

Register No. 028

Copy Number

HEADQUARTERS  
FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY

Classification ~~SECRET~~ (Changed to  
[REDACTED]) by authority of CG

DATE: 11 Sept 1944  
AUTH: CG, EAM  
INITIALS: [REDACTED]

APD 740, U S Army  
11 September 1944

ADJ Gen.

SUBJECT: Task Force for Operation "MARKET".

TO : Lieutenant General F. A. M. Browning, CB, DSO.

1. Confirming verbal instructions from the Commanding General, FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY, 10 September 1944, you are hereby designated to command the initial task force for Operation "MARKET".

a. Order of Battle.

(1) Initial Echelon:

Hq. Br. Airborne Corps  
1st British Airborne Division  
Polish Independent Parachute Brigade  
SAS Troops  
2d Air Landing Light AA Battery  
878th US Airborne Engineer Battalion  
82d US Airborne Division  
101st US Airborne Division  
AFDAG

(2) Second Echelon:

Hq. XVIII US Corps (Airborne)  
52d (L) Division (Airportable)

b. Mission.

Capture and hold crossings over the canals and rivers on the main axis of advance of the British Second Army, ie: EINDHOVEN-GRAVE-NIJMEGEN-ARNHEM.

c. Y Date.

15 September 1944.

d. Planning.

(1) Outline Plan. See outline plan Operation "SIXTEEN", prepared at Headquarters, British Airborne Troops, 10 September 1944, transposing 82d US Airborne Division and 101st US Airborne Division.

(2) You will proceed at once with detailed planning in accordance with conversations at this Headquarters, 10 September 1944, with the Commanding General, FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY.

(3) You are authorized to deal directly with the following:

- (a) TWENTY-FIRST ARMY GROUP
- (b) 82d US Airborne Division
- (c) 101st US Airborne Division
- (d) 878th US Airborne Engineer Battalion
- (e) IX Troop Carrier Command
- (f) XVIII US Corps (Airborne)

(4) You will secure the allocation and use of the 38 and 46 Groups, RAF.

962

43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51  
Copies 42, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62 and 63  
19358 destroyed 27 Dec 44  
#48 destroyed 10 June 45  
CE Benedict, CW 44  
CE Benedict W 2 J 44  
PO Key # 1107047



- (5) You will deal with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, of this Headquarters on matters pertaining to air force support.
- (6) You will secure the concurrence of the Commanding General, FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY, of your detailed plan before announcing same as a firm decision.

e. Command.

- (1) Initial Task Force Commander, Lieutenant General F. A. M. Browning, CB, DSO.
- (2) Troop Carrier Force Commander, Major General P. L. Williams.
- (3) Upon making contact with ground forces, the airborne task force will come under command of the C-in-C, NORTHERN GROUP OF ARMIES.
- (4) At the time that the second echelon is introduced into the combat zone, new consideration will be given to the matter of command.

By command of Lieutenant General BRERETON:

*F. L. Parks*  
F. L. PARKS,  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.  
Chief of Staff

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| 34-35 | - | CG, XVIII US CORPS (AIRBORNE)                          |
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HEADQUARTERS  
FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY

~~SECRET~~  
~~CHIEF, CIAA~~  
~~DATE: Sept 44~~  
~~INTENTION~~

AF0 740, U S Army  
11 September 1944

## SHORT SUMMARY OF THE IRBONEV OPERATION "MARKET"

1. It is understood that the basic purpose of the operation is to seize and secure the crossings over the MAAS, WAAL and RHEINE rivers along the axis GRAVE - NIJMEGEN - ARnhem, to assist British SECOND ARMY in its advance into Holland and eastward.

2. The proposal to drop the 101st Airborne Division in seven separate areas along an axis some thirty miles in length is considered to lessen the chances of successful accomplishment of the basic mission. Such a dispersion of this division destroys its tactical integrity, renders it incapable of fighting as a division, and presents an almost unsurmountable problem of air resupply. Each of the small groups is susceptible of being destroyed in detail, without accomplishing its mission.

3. The proposed scheme of employment of the 101st Airborne Division also offers serious objections from the air point of view as follows:

- a. Difficulty of dropping accurately on so many small pinpoint dropping zones.
- b. The problem of finding suitable dropping zones and landing zones in each of these particular areas.
- c. Exposure of the air lift to hostile fire over such a large area.
- d. Difficulties of air resupply, as mentioned in paragraph 2 above.

4. It is therefore proposed to drop the three airborne divisions in three general areas, namely: ARNHEM, NIJMEGEN and UDEN, so that each may be assembled and capable of effective divisional action in the least practicable time and so that, at least two of the airborne divisions, will at all times be mutually supporting. If successful, this would secure the critical crossings of the main streams while so placing at least one division (101st) as to permit offensive action to the south, southeast or southwest.

Classification ~~SECRET~~ (Changed to  
*Secret*) by authority of CG  
EASA on 30 Oct. 44 by:  
*F. K. [Signature]* ADJ Gen.

LEWIS H. BRIDGEMAN,  
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.  
Commanding

# 4 exchanged 21 May 45  
 Oberlin, Ohio  
 Ohio, 1945

220

564

# UNCLASSIFIED



Classification cancelled (Changed to  
[REDACTED] by authority of CG  
[REDACTED] on *1 Nov 44* by:  
*RAY* ADJ Gen.

*gr*  
*SL*

"MARKET"

[REDACTED]

OPERATION ~~(SIXTEEN)~~

Outline Plan

INFORMATION

1. Enemy

*100% destroyed 10 June 45  
at Breda, Neth.*

The enemy is fighting determinedly along the ALBERT Canal from inclusive ANTWERP to inclusive MAASTRICHT. He has elements of two infantry divisions and elements of two parachute divisions, plus a large number of flak units, holding the canal. None of these troops has yet fought the Allies in the WEST, so that they are fighting stubbornly and their morale is good. There is every sign of the enemy strengthening the river line through ARNHEM and NIJMEGEN, especially with flak. The latter is sited for dual purpose role - both A.A. and ground.

2. Own Troops

Guards Armoured Division is across the canal in the area HASSELT - HECHTEL - BOURG LEOPOLD.

50 Division and 11 Armoured Division are fighting for bridgeheads between Guards Armoured Division and ANTWERP.

15 Division is reaching ANTWERP to-day.

It is the intention of the Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group to advance NORTH across the MAAS, WAAL and NEDER RIJN, form a strong bridgehead NORTH of ARNHEM and continue his operations NORTH into HOLLAND and EAST against the REICH. The main axis of the advance is EINDHOVEN - GRAVE - NIJMEGEN - ARNHEM.

INTENTION

3. Airborne Corps will capture and hold crossings over the canals and rivers on Second Army's main axis of advance.

METHOD

4. 1 British Airborne Division

Will land and capture the ARNHEM bridges with sufficient bridgehead to pass formations of Second Army through.

82 U.S. Airborne Division

Will seize and hold the bridges at NIJMEGEN and GRAVE with the same object in view. The capture and retention of the high ground between NIJMEGEN and GROESBEEK is imperative in order to accomplish the Division's task.



101 ~~st~~ U.S. Airborne Division

Will seize the following on the Second Army's main axis to ensure the speedy pass through of that Army to the GRAVE, NIJMEGEN and ARNHEM crossings:-

- a. Canal crossing 3896
- b. WALKENSWAARD
- c. EINDHOVEN
- d. Bridge in square 4425
- e. ST OEDENRODE
- f. VEGHEL
- g. UDEN

52 (L) Division

Will be flown in NORTH of ARNHEM as soon as airfields are available.

LIFTS

5. In principle as for LINNET

TIMINGS

6. Preferably late evening, but will probably have to accept morning owing to 8th Air Force support.

INTER-COMMUNICATION

7. H.Q. Airborne Corps will have direct links with 30 Corps, Second Army and 21 Army Group.

101 ~~st~~ U.S. Airborne Division will have two direct links - one to Second Army and one to 30 Corps.

Other signal lay-out, including air support, as for LINNET.

ADMINISTRATION

8. Supply will be by air for the whole force.

TAILS

9. 1 British Airborne Division - 30 Corps, as for COMET  
Tails for American Divisions as for LINNET.

SUPPORTING UNITS

10. Any supporting A/Tk guns or reconnaissance units required by American Airborne Divisions will be supplied by Second Army.

10 Sep 44